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ALLOWING LARGE HOSPITALS TO MERGE:
UNITED STA TES v. LONG ISLAND JEWISH
MEDICAL CENTER
Kenneth E. Yeadon"

INTRODUCTION
In October 1997, a federal district court allowed the two largest, most
prestigious hospitals on Long Island, New York, to merge.' In United
States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center2 the court rejected the

Federal Trade Commission's attempt to prevent the merger of Long Island
Jewish Medical Center and North Shore Health Systems under Section 7
of the Clayton Act.
4
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the Clayton Act.
The Clayton Act forbids mergers where a reasonable probability exists
that the firms could force prices above competitive levels, and thereby

"Authorities Editor, DEPAUL JOURNALOF HEALTH CAR LA%,W.
BA., Vestern Vashington
University, 1991; C.P.A., Washington State, 1992; J.D. (Cand.) DePaul University, 2000,
'See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121,149 (E,D,No.Y 1997).
2 See id.
3

See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (stating that "[n]o parzon engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the %%holeor
any part of the stock [of another person] ... [w]here the effect of such acquisition may bz
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
4
See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Congress vested authority in five federal
agencies to enforce the Clayton Act- the Interstate Commerce Commission for common carriers
regulated by that agency; the Federal Communications Commission for common cariers
regulated by that agency; the defunct Civil Aeronautics Board; the Federal Re-arve Board for
banks; and the Federal Trade Commission for activities not covered by the other four agencies.
See id. See also FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that nonprofit hospitals fell under the FTC's jurisdiction to enforce the Clayton Act because no
other agency listed in Section 11 regulated the hospitals).
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"hurt consumers."' Historically, courts granted practically every hospital
merger injunction requested by the FTC.6 Recently, several courts refused
to grant injunctions mainly because economic conditions in the healthcare
industry warranted the mergers.7 These mergers appear to violate the
Clayton Act by providing the merged hospitals with enough market power
to profitably increase prices.8 In cases like Long IslandJewish Medical
Center, however, the government's antitrust strategies did not address
changes in the healthcare industry.
This article reviews the decision in Long Island Jewish Medical
Center, and discusses the reasons behind the government's loss in the
case. A background into antitrust law and recent changes in the healthcare
industry is provided first.
BACKGROUND
Changes in the healthcare industry affect the application of antitrust law
to hospital mergers. This section provides background into antitrust law,
notes the changes in New York State's health care industry, and
introduces the merging hospitals.
The Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act outlaws mergers that "substantially lessen
competition, or tend to create a monopoly."9 Congress passed the Clayton
Act in 1914, in reaction to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
5

United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1990).
See University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1225 (vacating the district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction); RockfordMem 'ICorp., 898 F.2d at 1286 (affirming the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1393 (7th Cir.
1986) (affirming the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction); FTC v. Columbia Hosp.
Corp., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,209 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 1994) (granting a preliminary
injunction without opinion).
7
See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1303 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(merging hospitals successfully rebutted the FTC's primafacie case by showing that increased
market share does not automatically translate into higher prices and profits). See also FTC v.
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the FTC failed to establish the
requisite relevant market); United States v. Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. 968,975 (N.D. Iowa
1995), vacatedas moot 107 F.3d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the FTC failed to establish
the requisite relevant market; hospitals subsequently abandoned merger plans).
8
See Mercy Health Ser., 902 F. Supp. at 975 (meeting the requirements of Section 7
requires that the govemment show a reasonable probability that the proposed transaction will
substantially lessen competition in the future).
9
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
6
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Sherman Act.1 ° Congress had enacted the Sherman Act to reel in railroad
cartels and oil and tobacco trusts." The Supreme Court fulfilled these
objectives, but made proving a Sherman Act violation too difficult."2

Today, Section 7 is understood to forbid mergers likely to "hurt
consumers, as by making it easier for the firms in the market to collude,
expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price[s] above or farther above the
competitive level."' 3
The government establishes a prima facie case under Section 7 by
demonstrating with reasonable probability t4 that the merged entity will
possess a large percentage of the relevant market,' 5 and may raise prices
above competitive levels.' 6 The government bears the burden ofproof and

must (1) define the relevant product market; (2) define the relevant
geographic market;

and (3) prove that the merger will result in

anticompetitive conditions and an increase
in prices above competitive
17
levels for a significant period of time.

The term "relevant markets" describes the markets in which the
merging parties currently compete. 8 Relevant markets include product
markets and geographic markets. A product market includes potential

"0 See Rocford Memn'l Corp., 898 F.2d at 1282 (responding to the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the drafters of the
Clayton Act identified particular anticompetitive practices and forbade those practices upon a
showing, not that they would, but merely that they might, lessen competition substantially).
"See id.
'2See id.
'3Id. at 1282-83.
4
See Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2nd Cir. 1979) (requiring a reazonable
probability of a substantial impairment of competition by an increase in prices above comp-attve
levels to render a merger illegal under Section 7). See also United States v. Falstaff Breving
Corp., 410 U.S. 526,555 (1973), mandate confornedto United States v.Falstaff Brevang Corp.,
383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974) (satisfying Section 7 requires more than remote posibiite:)
'5See FruehaufCorp.,603 F.2d at 351. See also United States v. Marine Bancorparation,
410 U.S. 602, 618 (1974) (determining the relevant product and geographic markets neces-anly
predicates finding whether a merger contravenes Section 7).
16See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,363 (1963). Sce also United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956) (holding that price and
competition are so intimately intertwined that any discussion must treat them as one. Price cannot
be conceivably controlled without power over competition, or vice-ver.a. An intention to
monopolize is presumed when a monopolist has power over price and competition )
"See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137 IEDNY.
1997).
"'Joe Sims, Symposium: Perspectiveson EficienciesandFaihnwgFrnmsin
,irgcr
Anal-s ts
A New Approach to the Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 64 A*,NrTRUST L.J. 633, 637 (1996)
[hereinafter Sims]. See also infra pp. 91-93.
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suppliers readily able to offer consumers a suitable alternative to the
defendant hospitals' services. 19 A product market should exclude
suppliers offering products too different from that of the defending
hospitals.2" The geographic market covers that geographic area to which
consumers can practically turn for alternative sources of the product and
2
in which the defending hospitals face competition. '
Proving a merger's anticompetitiveness involves a two-step
analysis.22 First, with reasonable probability, will the merged entity
possess enough market power to profitably increase prices above
competitive levels for a substantial period oftime?23 Second, considering
that increased market share and leverage, will the merged entity reduce the
quality of services offered?24 Alternatively, the government establishes
a prima facie showing that the merger will result in anticompetitive effects
by demonstrating that the merged entity will possess an undue share of the
relevant market.
Defendants may rebut the government's prima facie case with
evidence that the intended merger would create significant efficiencies in
the relevant market.2 6 The merger's increased efficiencies must enhance
and not hinder competition. 7 The defendants must show that the merger,
and not any other factor, will generate significant economies.2 8 Further,
these economies must be shown to ultimately benefit consumers. 29 As
part of this analysis, the not-for-profit status of merging hospitals will be
considered ifsupported by evidence that the status inhibits anticompetitive
effects.3"

2'"See FTC

v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
°See id.
"See id.
'See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 142.

'See id. See also FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1078 (D.D.C. 1997) (preventing
Staples, an office supply superstore, from merging with Office Depot because Staples, as the only
remaining office superstore, could raise prices without fearing the effects of competition).
4

See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 142.
2'See id. at 145.
6
See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (1 th Cir. 1991).

2"See United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (Minn. 1990).

28See University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1223.
"See id.
"See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 146 (E.D.N.Y
1997). See also infra pp. 94.
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Courts are suspicious of the efficiencies defense.3t To sustain the
defense, defendants must clearly demonstrate that the proposed merger

will create a net economic benefit for health care consumers. 2 To this
end, alleged efficiencies are often speculative, and vigorously disputed. 33
In addition, whether the merger's efficiencies actually trickle down to

consumers is difficult to measure.34
Given this background into antitrust law, the next section discusses
conditions in New York's health care industry that encouraged Long
Island Jewish and North Shore Health Systems to merge.
The Healthcare Industry

in New York State
The New York healthcare industry has experienced significant changes

over the past ten to twenty years. 5 Predominantly, the industry has seen
the entry of managed care health organizations (MCOs), a surplus of

hospital beds, and decreasing government funding from Medicare and
Medicaid.36 This section provides an overview of these changes.
State and local governments began encouraging MCOs to insure
citizens in the 1980's and early 1990's. 37 By that time, governmental
entities realized that many citizens could not afford the cost of medical
3

See Sims, supra note 18.
Long IslandJeish, 983 F. Supp. at 147.
See id.
3See id.
35
See id. at 127.
35
See id. at 127-29.
32
33See

37

See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 127. Hospital professionals distinguish among
the types of care various facilities provide based on the sophistication of services rendered, and
the seriousness and complexity of the illnesses treated. See United States v. Carilion Health Sys,
707 F. Supp. 840,844 (W.D. Va. 1989) (discussing that service levels include primary, Escondary,
tertiary, and acute care. Hospital offering primary care services prevent, detect, and treat disea:es
The primary care level includes obstetrics, gynecology, internal medicine, and general surgery.
Primary care hospitals usually owvn diagnostic equipment to perform X-rays and laboratory
analysis. Secondary care involves more sophisticated treatment than primary care. This cervice
level includes cardiology, respiratory care, and physical therapy. This level features more
sophisticated diagnostic equipment and laboratory capabilities than primary care. Tertiary care
acts to arrest disease already in progress. This level usually includes heart surgery and cancer
treatments like chemotherapy. The quality of diagnostic equipment and laboratory capabilities is
higher than primary and secondary care. Acute care requires hospitalization, and cannot bprovided on an outpatient basis. While a significant number of problems can be treated on an
inpatient or outpatient basis, reasonable doctors differ as to whether inpatient or outpatient
treatment is most appropriate. Because outpatient care is less expensive, insurance camera
generally structure their reimbursement policies to encourage patients to use outpatient service.)
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care or insurance.3 A MCO is an organized system of health care that, for
a defined group of people, provides insurance, payments, and health care
services. 39 Because MCOs insure a vast number of people, MCOs exert
great leverage in pressuring physicians and hospitals to provide quality
care at reasonable prices.40 Recognizing that inpatient hospital care is by
far the most expensive cost of medical care, MCOs developed and
promoted inpatient care alternatives.4a
Previously, MCOs did not market in New York because the State set
the rates charged by hospitals.4 2 In New York's regulated market, MCOs'
negotiation advantage gained from representing so many patients carried
little incentive existed to find
little weight. 43 Because the State set rates,
44
costs.
inpatient
expensive
to
alternatives
New York patients utilized inpatient hospital care for lack of
alternatives. 4' This system created the most hospital dependent health care
system in the United States. 6 The average hospital stay was significantly
longer than in almost every other major metropolitan area. 7 In response,
New York hospitals created the capacity to service the market, but could
barely meet demand. While New York supplied nine beds per capita,
occupancy sometimes exceeded one hundred percent.49
In the late 1980s, New York's legislature began to loosen the
regulatory grip on health care.5" A form of the MCO, the health
maintenance organization (HMO), was allowed to negotiate rates with
hospital providers. 5 Still, other types of MCOs remained subject to
regulation, were forced to pay the higher state regulated rates, and held
little economic incentive to compete in the state. 2 The legislation had

8
See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 127.
"See id.
40See id.
'"See id.
"See id.
4'See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 127.
44See id.
4-See id.
46See id.

47See id.

4'See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 127.
49See id.
"See id.
5
See id.
2
See id.
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little impact because HMO's were only a small percentage of the
hospitals' business.53
On January 1, 1997, New York deregulated hospital rates. 4 Now, all
MCOs are free to negotiate prices, greatly accelerating their penetration
ofthe New York marketplace.55
Anticipating deregulation, hospitals were
56
already working with MCOs.
An effect of MCOs was to reduce hospital prices." Industry experts
predicted that prices would fall even farther because hospitals need the
patients controlled by MCOs5 MCOs have also created surplus hospital
beds.59 Focusing on costs, MCOs have encouraged outpatient treatments
and shorter hospital stays when possible.60
Hospitals have experienced financial pressure from the changes in the
industry.6 1 In addition to having to negotiate for decreased rates with
MCOs, Medicare and Medicaid payments are decreasing.6" Efforts to
balance the federal budget have focused on trimming payments to health
care providers.63 Over the next six years, Medicare payments to the
hospitals will be reduced by $44 billion!6 All hospital rates for Medicare
are frozen, without regard to inflation.65
Given this understanding of economic conditions in New York's
health care industry, the next section introduces the merging hospitals.

53See Long IslandJewish, 9S3 F. Supp. at 127.
5See id.
5
'See id.
55

See id. On April 30, 1996, a Long Island Jewish report stated that'to date, the hospital
has active agreements with over 35 managed care entities. In confirmation ofthe effectivene:3 of
its strategy of managed care contracting, inpatient discharges for managed care member3 for the
first three months of 1996 has surpassed by 35% such activity for all of 1995. Sce id
57See id. at 128.
"See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 129.
"See id.
69See id.
61See id.
62See id.
"See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 129.
"See id. at 128 (beginning in 1997, over a five-year period, Long Island Je, ash %.illloze
more than SSS million andNorth Shore Manhasset will lose SS7 million in Medicare and Medicaid

payments).
6

SSee id.
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The Hospitals
North Shore Health Systems and Long Island Jewish Medical Center
(Long Island Jewish) are large institutions located fairly close to one
another.66 North Shore Health Systems owns nine hospitals: one in
Queens County, five in Nassau County, two in Suffolk County, and one
on Staten Island.67 North Shore Health System's major hospital is North
Shore Manhasset, and is located in the northwesterly portion of Nassau
68
County.
Long Island Jewish is two miles away from North Shore Manhasset
in the most easterly portion of Queens County. 69 Long Island Jewish is
comprised of three institutions: Long Island Jewish, a 450 bed acute care
adult facility; Schneider's Children's Hospital, a 150 bed acute care
facility; and Hillside Hospital, a 220 bed psychiatric ward."0 Long Island
Jewish is also an academic teaching center affiliated with the Albert
Einstein School of Medicine.7 '
Long Island Jewish faces competition in each area of practice. The
primary competitors of Long Island Jewish in the psychiatric field are the
Nassau County Medical Center and Elmhurst Hospital in Queens.72 In
pediatrics, Long Island Jewish competes with almost every hospital on
Long Island who has inpatient pediatric services.73 This includes
Winthrop University Hospital (Winthrop Hospital) in Nassau, New York
Hospital of Queens, Good Samaritan Hospital in Suffolk, and the
Manhattan hospitals.74
Long Island Jewish is committed to treating all patients who walk
through the door, regardless of their ability to pay or their source of
reimbursement.75 The profile of the patient population at Long Island
Jewish, categorized by the type of payer, is: thirty percent Medicare,
twenty percent Medicaid, twenty percent classic indemnity insurance
carriers, and thirty percent various type of managed care insurance

66

See id. at 126.

67

68See

id. at 125.

See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 125.

69

See id.
70See id. at 126.

7'See id.
72See id.

73See
Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 126.
74See id.
7"See id.
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carriers. 76 Fifty percent of the Long Island Jewish patient population
resides in Queens, thirty percent in Nassau, and the balance in Suffolk,
Manhattan, and Westchester. 77
North Shore Manhasset is an academic teaching hospital affiliated
with the New York University School of Medicine. 73 The patient profile
at North Shore Manhasset is forty percent Medicare and Medicaid and
thirty percent managed care, which increased from fifteen percent several
years ago. 79

The rest of the patients have commercial insurance

companies or are self-payers.' °
North Shore Manhasset has a tradition of community assistance. The
hospital's clinics opened on the same day as the hospital. 1 Additionally,
prior to the introduction of Medicaid in 1966, North Shore Manhasset's
attending physicians were committed to treating the poor vthout charge. 2
Today, this tradition has evolved into 150 to 200 hospital administered
outreach programs, inwhich North Shore Manhasset personnel go into the
community to address health problems and advise on preventative
medicine.83
Both hospitals offer similar levels of service. Approximately eighty
to eighty-five percent ofthe services provided by North Shore Manhasset
and Long Island Jewish are primary/secondary services. All community
hospitals in Queens and Nassau also provide these services! 4 The
remaining services are for tertiary care.85 The hospitals' reputations,
however, distinguish them from all other hospitals in the vicinity. C6
The CEO of United Health Care stated that North Shore Manhasset
7ompanyY
and Long Island Jewish are "must have" hospitals for that
United Health Care is the third largest health care insurer in the United
States covering 25 million persons and 1.1 million New Yorkers.7 The

76

See id.

7'See id.
7'See Long IslandJewish,983 F. Supp. at 126.
79See id.

80See id.
"'See id.
82See id.

8'See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 126.
£4See id. at 127.

"See id.
"See id.
'7Id. at 130.

"See LongIsland Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 130.
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CEO stated that United could not build a marketable network on Long
Island if the company had to drop one of the hospitals from the plans
offered to customers. 89
Winthrop Hospital is a large teaching facility in Nassau County on
Long Island. 90 While Winthrop was ranked one of the "100 Best
Hospitals" in the United States by U.S. News & World Report, Winthrop
cannot match the prestige of Long Island Jewish and North Shore
Manhasset. 9 ' Insurers need Jewish Medical Center or North Shore
Manhasset to build a strong network. 9z
SUBJECT OPINION
The FTC requested preliminary and permanent injunctions under Section
7 of the Clayton Act 9 3 to prevent North Shore Health Systems and Long
Island Jewish from merging. 94 With the merger pending, the federal
district court expedited the case and refused to grant a permanent
injunction. 95 While the court addressed a total of six issues,96 the
97
government lost the case on the first issue, the relevant product market.
The following sections address each issue.
Relevant Product Market
The government started with the burden of proving that the merged
hospitals would possess a large percentage of the relevant product
market. 98 The government lost the case on this issue because the court
refused to accept the government's definition of the relevant product
market.99 The government defined the relevant product market as anchor
hospitals providing primary and secondary services.' 0 Anchor hospitals
possess prestigious reputations, broad-ranging and highly sophisticated

89

See id.
See id. at 131.
91
d"
9

92See id. at 132.
93
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
94See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 125.
5
See id. at 126.
96

See id. at 125.

97

See id. at 140.

93

See id.

"See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 140.
'"See id.
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services, and high-quality medical staffs. 10 ' The court disagreed with the
government's argument, finding the relevant
product market as general
2
acute care inpatient hospital services.1
The premise ofthe government's argument was that North Shore and
Long Island Jewish's reputation distinguished them from all other
hospitals on Long Island. 0 3 While many other hospitals offered similar
services and comparable quality, North Shore and Long Island JevAsh's
reputations as premier hospitals placed them in the anchor hospital
market.4 On Long Island, the anchor hospital market included only three
institutions: North Shore Manhasset, Long Island Jewish, and Winthrop
Hospital.' 5
The court found the government's characterization of the relevant
product market which included only anchor hospitals, as unnecessarily
restrictive, given the number of hospitals in the area that offered the same
services as Long Island Jewish and North Shore Health Systems.1' a The
majority (85%) ofthehospitals' business was fromprimary and secondary
care, and many other hospitals on Long Island deliver similar acute
inpatient care services. 07 For the same reason, the court was not
convinced that North Shore's and Long Island Jewish's reputation, or
cachet, determined where consumers went for healtheare. 1 3 The court
found that reputation demonstrated where patients currently went, not
where patients could practically go for acute care inpatient services.'
The court observed that the government's anchor hospital argument
was doomed anyway because another hospital of similar size and

101See id.
"02See id.

"°3See id.
'O'See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 140.

"5See id.
" See id. (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,590-91 (1966) (Fortas, J.,
with Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing narrow market definitions tailored only to those activities
in which defendants engage; relevant markets include alternative sources of,and substitutes for,
defendants' products reflecting "commercial realities").

"See id. at 41 (competing hospitals include Winthrop Hospital, Nassau County Medical
Center, ten general acute care hospitals in Queens County, and eight general acute care hospitals

in Nassau County).
""SSee id.
"See Long lslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 138-39.
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reputation, Winthrop Hospital, was available."' Winthrop, a teaching
facility providing primary, secondary, and tertiary health care services,
qualifies as an anchor hospital.'' The court went on to address the rest of
the issues to complete the record.
Relevant Geographic Market
The relevant geographic market turned on the availability of alternative
sources for health care consumers, should the merged hospitals increase
prices. 1 2 The parties based their arguments on different geographic
markets that included permutations of Nassau, Queens, Western Suffolk
County, and Manhattan. 1 3 The court heard evidence that patients prefer
to receive health care treatment near their homes."' Evidence further
demonstrated that many Queens, Nassau, and Suffolk residents traveled
5 Reviewing this evidence,
to Manhattan for certain tertiary treatments.
6
1
the court found two geographic markets.
7
The first geographic market was for primary and secondary care."1
These services constituted eighty-five percent of the hospitals'
activities." 8 This market included only Queens and Nassau; Manhattan
and Western Suffolk County hospitals were considered too far away to
provide reasonably suitable alternative care." 9 The second geographic
market was for tertiary care. 20 This market
included Manhattan, Queens,
2'
County.'
Suffolk
Western
Nassau, and

"'See id. at 140 (noting that the government's own economist testified that Winthrop
Hospital offered the same services as Long Island Jewish and North Shore Manhasset. The court
also observed that U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT ranked Winthrop Hospital as one of the top 100
hospitals in the United States).
"'See id.
"'See id. at 140 (defining the relevant geographic market as the area in which consumers
can practically find alternative healthcare sources; therefore, the defendant hospitals face
competition in these areas).
"'See id.
4
SeeLong IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 141.
1'See id.

" 6See id.
"'Seeid.
"'See id.
"'SeeLong Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 141 (noting the presumption that hospital
consumers prefer to receive care near their homes).
12See id.
"'See id.
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Anticompetitive Effects of the Merger
Determining the anticompetitive effects ofthe merger involved a two-step
analysis.12 2 The first step asked whether, with reasonable probability, the
merged entity would have enough market power to profitably increase
prices above competitive levels for a substantial period of time.'2 The
second step asked whether the merged hospitals, given increased market
share and leverage, might reduce the quality of care, treatment, and
medical services rendered. 124
The hospitals satisfied the first step by convincing the court that the
merger would not likely cause a price increase.'2 The government argued
that the hospitals would raise prices twenty percent."'b In their defense,
2
the hospitals presented testimony directly controverting that argument. 1
That testimony was supported with evidence about New York's health
care economy.12 8 Health care rates, including hospital prices, were
steadily falling in the wake of deregulating New York's health care
industry. 29 Additionally, the hospitals had agreed with the State not to
raise prices for at least two years after merging.'
The government did not establish aprimnafaciecase' because the
court held that the merged hospitals would not possess an undue share of
the relevant market.132 In 1994, excluding newborns, Long Island Jewish
had 7.7 percent of the Queens inpatient discharges and North Shore had
11.8 percent of the Nassau inpatient discharges. 33 In 1995, in Queens,
Nassau, and Suffolk, 12.9 percent of the patients came from the merging
hospitals, with 87 percent of the patients in other hospitals.134

"2 See id. at 143. But see United States v. Vail Resorts, Inc., 62 F.R, 5037 (1997) (holding
that, in a proposed merger between ski resorts owning all the available ski lifts in the relevant

market, the merger would result in anticompetitive effects because the merged re:orts could
unilaterally raise prices without the risk of losing skiers to a competitor).
'224See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 143.
1 See id.
'2"See
id.
126See id. at 144.
' 27See id. at 143.
"2SeeLong Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 144.
2
"SSee id. (noting that this was due to a combination of empty hospital beds, and MCO3'
ability to negotiate).
"30See id. at 145.
1'See id.
132 See id.
13See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 145.
34 See id.
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Furthermore, approximately 50 percent of revenues came from
Medicare and Medicaid patients. 135 This is significant because the
government, not the hospitals, sets those prices. 36 Of the remaining 50
percent, MCOs provide many of the patients.137 At trial, MCOs testified
in favor of the merger stating that they would seek out other available
hospitals if there were a price increase. 13
The government also lost on the second step of the anticompetitive
analysis. 39 Credible evidence did not exist to show that the merged
hospitals would not attempt to reduce costs or result in any disincentives
to reduce services to or treatment of patients. 40 In defense, the hospitals
put forward the principal reasons behind the merger: advancing high
quality patient treatment, fostering physician education and training,
pursuing
medical research, and avoiding duplication resulting in lower
4
costs.' '

The Effect of the Not-for-Profit
Status of the Hospitals
42
A not-for-profit status does not exempt hospitals from antitrust law.
The court considered not-for-profit status to the extent that
other evidence
43
anticompetitiveness
inhibited
status
demonstrated the

13

See id.

136See id.
"'See id.
"'See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 145.
139See id. at 142.
40

See id.
14'See id.

142See id. at 145.
143SeeLonglslandJewish,983 F. Supp. at 145. See also FTC v. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp.

1285, 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that nonprofit status could be a relevant consideration if
supported by other evidence that anticompetitive effects would not result; offered testimony
included the chairman of the hospital's board of directors with whom the merger idea originated);

FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 271 (8th Cir. 1995) (considering merging hospitals' status
as nonprofit entities); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. at 840, 849 (W.D. Va.
1989) (discussing the merging hospitals' nonprofit status as indicative of the merger's

reasonableness because the hospitals' boards of directors included business leaders who could be
expected to demand that the merger's cost savings would reduce hospital charges, which are paid

in many cases by employers, either directly or through insurance carriers).
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Neither hospital showed any intent to act in an anticompetitive
manner. 44 While the court emphasized the "proven good intentions ofthe
145
Board members," those good intentions were adjudged fleeting.
Inevitably, the hospitals' boards will change members and the current
boards' assurances will no longer carry any weight.t 46 Therefore, the court
did not rely on the hospitals' not-for-profit status in allowing continuation
of the merger. 4
Alleged Efficiencies Resulting from
the Proposed Merger
Analyzing the expected efficiencies to result from the merger require a

two-step analysis.148 First, whether the defendant hospitals clearly
demonstrated that the proposed merger itself would, in fact, create a net
economic benefit for the health care consumer. 4 9 Second, whether those
savings would be passed on to consumers.150 The burden of proof rested
with the hospitals to show that the actual merger, rather than any other

factor, resulted in significant economies and that these economies
ultimately benefitted the consumer. 5 '

The court was amenable to the idea that the merger created a net
economic benefit for the health care consumer.' 52 Both sides had
proposed a wide range of possible cost savings." 3 Reviewing the
'"See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 145 (noting that good intentions are evidenced
by the fact that board members work for free, and provide million of dollars in free mcdical care
to persons in need. Profits are funneled back into the community in the form ofnew programs and
facilities).
'45Id
"
14'See id.
'4"See id.
1'See id. at 147.
14'See Long islandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 147.
'50See id. at 149.

'-5 See id. at 147. As stated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the United States
Department ofJustice and the FTC (Revised 418197), Section 4.0: "Efficiencies generated through
mergers can enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, w~hich may result in
lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products. The Merger Guidelines
acknowledge that the realization of efficiency benefits often is the impetus for merger
transactions."
See id.
52
1 See id.

" See id. The hospitals' expert estimated the merger to result in annual operating cost
savings ofS92 million, and a one-time capital savings ofS78 million. The savings were to come
from eliminating management, administrative, and clinical employees, saving money on capital
expenditures, economies in purchasing medical supplies, the consolidation ofinformation systems,
and reducing the hospitals' enormous laundry bills.
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proposals, the court selected a middle number, $25 million to $30 million,
for the projected savings in operating expenditures.' 54 Regarding capital
savings, the court found both parties' projections too speculative. 5 The court also agreed that the merger would result in benefits to
consumers.1 56 Noting the hospitals' not-for-profit status, the court found
that the hospitals were genuinely committed to helping their
communities. 57 Additionally, the hospitals agreed with the State to pass
on to local communities costs savings of$ 100 million during the five-year
period beginning January 1998.158 This agreement guaranteed the
surrounding communities a minimum of $50 million.' 59 The court
concluded that, with reasonable certainty, the efficiencies16 gained in the
merger would ultimately result in benefits to consumers. 1
Entry
Lastly, the court noted the growth in the health care market on Long
Island.16' A new hospital located within seven miles of Long Island
Jewish, New York Hospital Queens, was under construction at the time of
the merger. 62 Additionally, other hospitals continued to merge and
expand on Long Island.163 The entry of new hospitals into the relevant
market led the court to conclude that Long Island Jewish and North Shore
could not increase prices above competitive levels and expect to continue
to attract patients.164

The government's expert estimated annual operating savings of $6.3 million, and reduction
in capital expenditures of $800,000. The savings in capital expenditures related mostly to a
reduction in depreciation charges. See id..
4
" See Long Island Jewish, 983 F. Supp. at 148.
'See
id.
IS6 See id. at 149.
157See id.

.58See id.

'5 See Long IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 149.
' 60See id.
16'See id.
' 62
63See id.

1 See id.
'1SeeLong IslandJewish, 983 F. Supp. at 149.
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ANALYSIS
The government brought this case with good reason. These two hospitals
offer the best medical treatment on Long Island. The government argued

that combined, the hospitals could raise prices and still attract patients. "'
Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that large institutional users need
these hospitals in their health care portfolios"tS Testimony from
executives for the Long Island Railroad explained that their union
considers accessibility to hospitals an important consideration in collective

bargaining. 16 7 The union's membership found access to North Shore
Manhasset, Long Island Jewish, and Stony Brook an integral part of any
16
collective bargaining agreement. s
The government argued that the size and importance of Long Island
Jeish and North Shore Manhasset distinguished them from all other
hospitals on Long Island offering similar services.169 By combining into
a single entity, Long Island Jewish/North Shore Manhasset could
unilaterally raise prices.170 The government, however, fought existing

case law in making this argument.
In hospital merger cases, a consensus exists among courts on the
relevant product market. 71 That consensus hold that the relevant product
65
1 See id.

1

"SSee id. at 131.

167See id.

...Seeid. Much testimony at trial addressed the government's contention that Long Island
Jewish and North Shore Manhasset are in a hospital class by themselves. The CEO of United
Health Care, the third largest insurer in the United States covering 1.1 million New Yorkers,
referred to Long Island Jewish and North Shore Manhasset as "must have hospitals" nccded to
build a marketable network on Long Island."
A senior vice president for MagnaCare, an MCO, testified that in order to operate on Long
Island "you have to have one of these facilities in [your] network." See id. Reputation mattered
to MagnaCare's customers. MagnaCare conceded that Winthrop Hospital possezsed the samme
services and quality of services as Long Island Jewish and North Shore Manhasset, but that
Winthrop lacked a comparable reputation.
The administrator for District Council 37 Health and Security Plan and Trust, the negotiator
ofhealth care packages for approximately 300,000 active workers and 100,000 retirees, stated that
an arrangement for the plan's members "could not [be] conceiv[ed] ...without thoze to
hospitals." See id. Finally, Cigna Healthcare of New York testified that without either Long
Island Jewish or North Shore Manhasset, "Cigna would probably lose its current clients and not
be able to market to a whole other population in the area." See id. at 130.
169
See Long IslandJewish,
70

1 See id.

983 F. Supp. at 138.

17

'See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier-HospitalMergers and

Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 199 (1997).
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market is the cluster of services consisting of acute care inpatient
services.72 Acute care inpatient services are services that must be
performed at a hospital.' 73 Because outpatient substitutes are not available

for these procedures, a check is not available to limit the price of those
procedures.' 74

Since 1989, five courts have followed this line ofreasoning. In 1995,
the Eighth Circuit in FTC v. Freeman Hospital held that the relevant

product market was acute care inpatient services.1 75 In that case, the
government sought to enjoin the merger of the two largest acute care

hospitals in the three-hospital town of Joplin, Missouri. 176 In 1991, the
Eleventh Circuit in FTC v. University Health, Inc., defined the relevant

product market as inpatient services offered by acute care hospitals in the
vicinity of Augusta, Georgia. 77 In Augusta, Georgia, five hospitals
already competed in the vicinity.178
In 1990, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Rockford Memorial
Corporationaffirmed the district court's holding that the market consisted
of the inpatient services offered by acute care hospitals in the vicinity of
Rockford, Illinois. 79 In 1995, the federal district court for the Northern

172

See id.
'7'See id.
" 4See id. (discussing that in addition to the relevant product market, courts have arrived
at three more general consensus. First, the geographic market is primarily local due to the
emergency nature of some care, and the preference of people to be hospitalized near their families
and homes. Second, applying the rule of presumptive illegality, courts consider a broad range of
factors that may support or undermine inferences to be drawn from market concentration and
market share evidence. These factors include the not-for-profit status of hospitals in the market,
the presence of sophisticated buyers, excess capacity, entry restrictions and the heterogeneity of
service offerings. Third, most courts evaluate the proposed efficiencies attributable to the merger;
however, significant differences exist in the way they assign proof burdens and otherwise weigh
the importance of purported cost savings.
'75See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260,263 (8th Cir. 1995) (ruling from the bench, the
district court denied the government a temporary order restraining the hospitals from merging
stating that "I don't think you've got any business being in here. I don't see how the Federal
Trade Commission can claim there is a lack of competition when there [are] four of five hospitals
in the area, and reducing it by one is not going to wipe out competition.... It looks to me like
Washington D.C. once again thinks that they know better what's going on in Southwest Missouri.
I think they
ought to stay in D.C.").
176See id. at 262.
'See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 (11 th Cir. 199 1) (noting that the
two merging hospitals did not compete in eleven acute service categories, but did compete in
nineteen8major diagnostic categories).
17See id.
' 79See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990).
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District of Iowa in United States v. Mercy Health Services held that the
relevant product market was acute care inpatient services offered by the
two merging hospitals."' In 1989, in United States v. CarilionHealth
Systems an advisory jury found that the relevant product market was acute
inpatient hospital services and certain outpatient health care services
provided by various clinics. 181
In holding that the relevant product market is restricted to acute
inpatient hospital services, courts are limiting the relevant product market.
In fact, the government generally agrees with this determination.' 2 The
FTC publishes policy statements on the agency's position regarding
hospital mergers.' 8 3 The policy statements encourage a market definition
under which there is a core of services delivered locally that requires the
facilities and services of an acute care institution. 184 Physicians are
viewed as key to any possible patient movement; therefore, agency
review is limited to analyzing hospitals to which the physicians who
utieze competing hospitals would likely refer or admit patientsC ' 5 Thus,
the resulting geographic area tends to be small.'
The merger guidelines influenced the courts in establishing this
consensus. Unfortunately for the government in Long Island Jewish
Medical Center, the merger guidelines worked to the government's
disadvantage. In a large market like Long Island, many hospitals offer
acute inpatient services. This case involved the merger of two very large
hospitals in an area filled with hospitals. Physicians using competing
hospitals could transfer patients or recommend that patients go to a variety
of hospitals other than Long Island Jewish or North Shore Manhasset.
The government did have an alternative strategy. That strategy
involved distinguishing Long Island Jewish from all other acute service
providers by the hospitals' reputation. 87 The government argued that the
relevant product market was limited to anchor hospitals offering primary

"OSee United States v. Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. 968, 976 (N.D. lov:.a 1995),

"'See United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 842 (W.D. Va. 19S9).
'nSee
Sims, supra note 18, at 637.
I83 See id.
'See id.
85
" See id.
'8 6See id.
'8'See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 138-39 (ED.N.Y.

1997).
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and secondary services."' This argument was premised on limiting the
market to as few hospitals as possible. In this case, the market would be
limited to three hospitals: Long Island Jewish, North Shore Manhasset,
and Winthrop Hospital.' 9
Courts have also rejected this argument before. In essence, courts are
interested in where consumers can go, not where consumers currently go
for hospital care.' ° This reputation, or cachet argument was rejected in
FTC v. Freeman Hospital.'91 There, the court stated that "placing too
much emphasis on the allegedly superior range of services available at
Joplin Hospital could ultimately lead to a blurring of the product market"
because the market would need to extend to any prestigious hospital in the
92
area. 1

In addition, the reputation argument arguably applies only to tertiary
services. Tertiary services can be scheduled in advance. Therefore, a
patient may not mind driving in to Manhattan for chemotherapy, or, like
in FTC v. Freeman Hospital,driving from Joplin, Missouri, to Kansas
City. North Shore Manhasset and Long Island Jewish, however, devote
eighty to eighty-five percent of their services to providing primary and
secondary care. 193 A patient seeking primary care for an ailment like a
gunshot wound gladly receives treatment at Long Island Jewish, but likely
would accept care from a lesser institution, like Winthrop Hospital.
Alternatively, the court could have rejected this argument because
Manhattan is only fifteen miles away from Long Island Jewish and North
Shore Manhasset. 194 A patent concerned with reputation can go to these
"very big, very famous, and very attractive" hospitals including New York
Hospital, Columbia, Sloan-Kettering, and Beth Israel.195
The government's case failed because too many hospitals exist in the
Long Island area that offer the same services as Long Island Jewish and

"'See id.
'"See id. at 141.

"'See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 260, 269 (8th Cir. 1995).
19'See id.
1921d.

"3See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 127 (E.D.N.Y.

1997).

'94See id. at 141.
1951d.
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North Shore Manhasset. 196 In a market with a shrinking hospital
population, an abundance of empty hospital beds, and negotiated reduced
rates, hospitals are compelled to consolidate, merge, or affiliate in order
to increase the quality and scope of their services and, most importantly,
to decrease costs.
IMPACT
In large markets like New York or Chicago, government attempts to
enjoin hospital mergers are likely to be unsuccessful. The law regarding
relevant markets has solidified to include all deliverers of acute care
services within the vicinity of the merging hospitals.
Proving an antitrust violation in a large market with many hospitals
will be a difficult task. Any attempt to distinguish certain large hospitals
based on reputation will likely fail because courts analyze where
consumers can go, not where they currently go. Prestige today does not
necessarily translate into continued prestige tomorrow.
In the largest markets, the government may have to pass on pursuing
antitrust actions against merging hospitals. This realization will not last
forever. In New York, a large number of acute care deliverers currently
exist as a result of years of dependence on inpatient care.
As mergers continue, the number of hospitals will decrease. As this
occurs, large hospitals may unilaterally increase prices. Then, the
government must step-in to mitigate anti-competitiveness. Due to market
conditions today, however, many of the largest metropolitan markets are
too saturated with hospitals to allow the government to win an antitrust
case.
CONCLUSION
The government will likely continue to attempt to enjoin hospital mergers
in large metropolitan markets. These attempts, however, will continue to
fail. So long as excess capacity is present, the relevant markets will
include too many hospitals to enjoin the mergers.

"9SSee id. (competing hospitals include Winthrop Hospital, Nassau County Medical Center,
ten general acute care hospitals in Queens County, and eight general acute care hospitals inNassau
County).
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